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This working paper takes the ONS’ April 2015 ‘Labour Market Statistics’ first release to examine the 
narratives on the state of UK employment presented in the Conservative and Labour Manifestos.  Data 
on total employment levels supports part of the Conservative claim on job creation (an additional 1.8 to 
2 million individuals employed since the start of the Parliament), but it is disingenuous to present this in 
terms of 1,000 jobs per day since May 2010 – as employment fell in a number of quarters between 2010 
and 2012.  This claim also fails to recognise the fact that the total working age population increased 
throughout the period, meaning that recovery in the rate of employment (as a proportion of the 
population aged 16-64) was much more uneven.   
 
Weak earnings growth provide some support for the Labour Party’s narrative of a recovery that has been 
over-reliant on poor quality, low pay employment, although pay growth is now above the rate of general 
price inflation. 
  
Changes in the structure of employment during the period of recession and initial period of uneven 
recovery have had significant impacts on the current picture.  There are now higher proportions working 
part-time, self-employed, or on temporary contracts than pre-recession.  Responses on reasons for part-
time or temporary work demonstrate a significant increase in people in either type of employment 
because they are unable to find full-time and/or permanent work – rather than by choice.   
 
Finally, trends in employment by occupation suggests a further ‘hollowing out’ of the skills profile of 
employment, with increases in the most highly skilled occupations, stability in the lowest-skilled 
activities, and significant falls in some intermediate occupations.  This represents a challenge for the 
Manifesto pledges made by both parties to increase the number of Apprentices – a level of training that 
is most likely to lead to employment in an intermediate-skilled occupation.   
 
Further research could disaggregate the impacts of recession and recovery by geography (e.g. region and 
devolved administration) and demographic group (e.g. age, gender, ethnicity and disability status) and 
could investigate any changes in subjective job satisfaction, happiness or wellbeing. 
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1. Introduction 
Each month, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) publish the ‘Labour Market Statistics’ (LMS) first 
release, which includes estimates from the latest available 3 month period of the Labour Force Survey 
alongside the monthly count of Jobseekers’ Allowance claimants. 
This provides us with a snapshot of recent changes in employment, unemployment, earnings and the 
structure of employment.  The data is published on the 2nd or 3rd Wednesday of every month, and 
frequently fuels questions and responses in Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs), which takes place 
from mid-day on Wednesday when Parliament is in session.   The data is also scrutinised by the Bank 
of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in their deliberations over interest rates.  This makes 
the LMS a key area of interest in the media. 
Alongside data for the latest quarter, each successive LMS includes a long time series (in many cases 
going back as far as 1992).  However, the frequency of these releases means that most coverage in 
the media, and debate amongst politicians, tends to focus on the very latest, short-term changes.  
Limited attention is focussed on longer term developments in the nature of UK employment and 
individual experiences of it.   
The latest LMS at the time of writing, published on the 17th of April, will be the last release before the 
General Election on May 7th.  This provides an opportunity to examine key claims and Manifesto 
commitments made by the main political parties (Conservative and Labour, one of which will form the 
core of the next Government).  This paper will seek to identify and analyse the longer-term structural 
changes that tend to be absent in the public debate, and will discuss them in the context of the two 
competing interpretations.   The Conservatives have emphasised the strength of the recent recovery 
in total employment numbers – with David Cameron describing the UK in successive recent speeches 
as the “jobs capital of Europe”.  Although accepting recovery at an aggregate level, Labour identify the 
long-running weak rates of wage growth (described this as indicative of a “cost of living crisis” prior to 
inflation falling below 1% on the CPI in December 2014), the uneven geographic nature of recovery 
and the apparent increase in temporary, low or zero hours employment contracts. 
In exploring the latest data, this paper applies the following definitions and has the following 
limitations in scope:  
• Recent trends in both overall employment and the structure of employment are explored at 
a UK-wide level.  There is insufficient time to investigate geographical variations – this could 
be an avenue for future analysis.  Headline regional data is published with the monthly LMS 
(covering employment, unemployment and economic inactivity) but more detailed data is 
available in the quarterly Labour Force Survey releases, which include 12 months of Labour 
Force Survey data (each quarter overlapping with the last by 9 months) and thus much larger 
sample sizes; 
• This paper deals with the working age population in aggregate, and includes only limited 
analysis by gender.  Again, gender and other demographic disaggregations (age, ethnicity, 
disability or country of birth) could be the focus of later analysis; 
• This paper takes the Labour Force Survey period December 2006 to February 2007 as a 
starting point, before the onset of recession in the UK in 2008, and the latest available data 
(December 2014 to February 2015) as an end-point.  Non-overlapping 3 month periods are 
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used in the time-series.  As the latest period overlaps the end/start of the year, these are not 
calendar quarters; and 
• Where ‘employment quality’ is discussed, this is explored in a fairly limited, objective context.  
Subjective questions on ‘job satisfaction’ are not included in the quarterly Labour Force Survey 
dataset, nor are questions of task determination and autonomy.  Instead, it is assumed in this 
paper that ‘quality employment’ should mean full-time, permanent employment for those 
who want it, in jobs that utilise the level of skill available in the labour force, with rates of pay 
growth exceeding general price inflation – as these are criteria that can be applied to analysis 
of the quarterly LFS.  Subjective views of quality of employment are investigated in the ESRC-
funded ‘Skills and Employment Survey’, which is undertaken relatively infrequently (with the 
latest data applying to 2012).  Future analysis of the LFS alongside this data source would 
provide an important subjective insight into individuals’ experience of the UK labour market. 
 
2. Manifesto Commitments 
This section looks at both the narratives on the state of employment in the UK and the Manifesto 
commitments set out by the Conservatives and Labour.  In the interests of brevity, this focusses on 
the two main parties, one of whom will form the core of any government.  
The Conservatives interpret the state of employment (and the wider economy) as follows:  
“Thanks to the success of our long-term economic plan, Britain is creating more jobs than the 
27 other countries of the European Union put together. That means more people with the 
security of a regular pay packet. Over the past five years, 1.9 million new jobs have been 
created; 1,000 jobs for every single day that we have been in government.”  
(The Conservative Party, May 2015. Page 17.) 
The Labour narrative is as follows: 
“Over five million people are in low-paid jobs, earning less than the Living Wage. There are 
1.8 million zero-hours contracts. 1.3 million are working part-time because they cannot get a 
full-time job. Half of all those in poverty live in working households. 900,000 people, many of 
them in work, used food banks last year. This cost-of-living crisis is bad for families, bad for 
business, and bad for Britain. Lower levels of pay have meant lower tax receipts and higher 
spending on social security.” 
(The Labour Party, May 2015.  Page 16.) 
Both Manifestos commit to an increase in the National Minimum Wage to £8 (Labour by 2019 and the 
Conservatives by 2020), with the Conservatives pledging an increase in the Personal Allowance 
threshold for Income Tax.  Both also emphasise reductions in welfare payments in order to incentivise 
work, with the Conservatives being more specific (or punitive), with their per-household cap on total 
benefits at £23,000 per annum (which will be monitored and enforced through the single Universal 
Credit payment).  Both parties have made very similar pledges on reducing the disincentives for 
parents with young children to seek full- or part-time work, with increased childcare entitlements. The 
Conservatives make ambitious pledges around job generation (“abolishing” unemployment/achieving 
3 
 
“full employment”) through levers mainly related to their Business Review:  which will inform further 
changes to National Insurance and unspecified reductions in employment regulations.  Labour identify 
productivity and employment increases through an improved vocational education system and a 
programme of infrastructure investment.  The Conservatives also identify low productivity as a 
problem, but advocate incentivising greater R&D activity alongside their wish to further reduce 
employment regulations.  Labour explicitly set out to ban “exploitative” zero hours contracts, whilst 
the Conservatives limit this to “exclusive” zero hours contracts (i.e. enabling individuals to hold 
multiple jobs).  Finally, the Conservatives have stated their intention to further tighten the criteria for 
legal strike action – increasing the voting participation threshold for all sectors, and increasing the 
threshold for the proportion of votes in support of a strike in the public services. 
Table 1: Summary of employment-related Manifesto commitments of the two main Parties 
 Conservative1 Labour2 
Narrative on the 
current state of 
the labour 
market 
Strong growth in the number of jobs, 
especially compared to elsewhere in 
Europe (and emphasising higher 
employment than “ever before”), 
resulting in improvements in 
household income.  Closely linked to 
wider strategy of fiscal austerity and 
resulting confidence of international 
markets. 
An economy and labour market that 
fails to reward those in work.   A shift 
in the structure of employment from 
“secure, full-time work, into 
precarious, badly paid jobs”, including 
and increase zero-hours contracts. 
Manifesto 
Commitments 
• Fiscal discipline. 
• Raising the National Minimum 
Wage to £6.70 this autumn 
and £8 by 2020; 
• Increasing the threshold 
(Personal Allowance ) for 
Income Tax from £10,600 to 
£12,500, meaning people paid 
the Minimum Wage will be 
taken out of tax; 
• Emphasis on the current 
£23,000 cap on benefit 
payments per household 
(“making work pay”); 
• Increase the number of 
Apprenticeships by 3 million; 
• Tax-free childcare for all and 
30 hours of free childcare a 
• Fiscal discipline -  a Budget 
that “cuts the deficit every 
year”; 
• Raising the National Minimum 
Wage to at least £8 by 2019; 
• Introduce Make Work Pay 
contracts to provide tax 
rebates to firms who become 
Living Wage employers; 
• Banning “exploitative zero-
hours contracts”; 
• Emphasis on vocational and 
technical education and 
training paths for young 
people; 
• Encouraging labour market 
participation for parents with 
young families by expanding 
1 The Conservative Party, May 2015. ‘Strong Leadership, A Clear Economic Plan, A Brighter, More Secure 
Future’.  URL: https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto  
2 The Labour Party, May 2015. ‘Britain Can Do Better: The Labour Party Manifesto 2015’.  URL: 
http://www.labour.org.uk/page/-/BritainCanBeBetter-TheLabourPartyManifesto2015.pdf  
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week for working parents of 3-
4 year olds; 
• Identifies low productivity and 
pledges investment in R&D 
and tax cuts and lighter 
regulation for business (also 
creating 2 million jobs, 
achieving “full employment”).  
This will be achieved through 
a major Business Review; 
• A key element of this will be 
changes to National Insurance 
(already abolished for 
employees under 21, to be 
extended to Apprentices 
under 25, and reduced for 
small business through the 
Employment Allowance) – 
described in the Manifesto as 
a “tax on jobs”; and 
• Further tightening on strike 
action, raising the criteria for 
legal industrial action (a ballot 
where half the workforce has 
voted, with a tougher 
threshold for the public 
services – which will require a 
supporting vote of at least 
40% of all those entitled to 
take part).  Employers will also 
be able to hire temporary staff 
during strike action. 
free childcare from 15 to 25 
hours for working parents of 
3-4 year olds and doubling 
paid paternity leave for 
fathers; 
• No increases to the basic or 
higher rates of Income Tax, 
National Insurance or VAT; 
• Identifies low productivity and 
pledges investment in 
transport infrastructure as a 
key solution. 
 
 
 
 
3. Trends in Total Employment and the Employment Rate 
This section investigates the narrative on employment described by the Conservatives – namely the 
increasing quantity of employment and extent of labour utilisation (measured by the employment 
rate).  On this, the Conservatives claim an increase in the total number employed that is equivalent to 
1,000 jobs for every day of the Parliament since 2010 (equivalent to 1.8 million). 
Chart 1 presents quarterly estimates of total employment levels alongside the total working-age 
population (aged 16-64).  This shows that: 
• Numbers in employment fell significantly between 2008 and 2009 (by -0.8%), following the 
onset of recession, and more sharply between 2009 and 2010 (by -1.4%).  Employment 
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recovered between 2010 and 2011 (by 1.4%) but then contracted slightly in the following year.  
At its lowest point (in December 2009 to February 2010), there were 29.02 million individuals 
over 16 in employment in the UK, down from 29.18 in the same period in 2007; 
 
• From the end of 2012/start of 2013 (December 2012 to February 2013), the numbers 
employed have been increasing quarter-on-quarter.  Between the period December 2013 to 
February 2014 and the same period a year earlier, total employment increased by 2.2%.  
According to the latest available period (December 2013 to February 2015) and the same 
period a year earlier, total employment increased by 1.8% - to a record 31.05 million 
individuals; but 
 
• The chart shows that the total size of the working age population (aged 16-64) increased in 
almost every quarter in the period illustrated.  Between 2007 and 2008 it increased by 0.9%, 
and then by 0.6% in each year until 2011 to 2012, from which point it slowed to 0.2% in every 
year except 2012-2013 (when the working age population increase was negligible). 
 
Chart 1: Working age population (thousands aged 16-64) and number in employment in 
the UK (thousands aged 16+), December 2006-February 2007 to December 2014-February 
2015 (non-overlapping quarters) 
Source: ONS Crown Copyright, 2015. ‘Labour Market Statistics, April 2015’, from A01 Labour Market 
Statistics Summary Data Tables [accessed 22nd April, 2015]. 
This is equivalent to a total increase of 1.9 million employed between the start of the Parliament (using 
the period March to May 2010) and the latest available period (December 2014 to February 2015).  
Because of seasonal variation, it is poor practice to compare inconsistent quarters.  A more meaningful 
comparison would be December 2009-February 2010 and the latest period, which suggests an 
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increase of 2.0 million employed.  However, it is disingenuous for the Conservatives to imply a 
consistent increase of 1,000 individuals employed per day, as Chart 1 illustrates that there were 
periods of contraction during the first 2-3 years of the Parliament. 
What the Conservative claim does not capture is the slower recovery in the rate of employment.  As 
the total size of the working age population increased throughout the period shown in Chart 1, 
including periods when employment contracted (2008-2009, 2009-2010 and 2011-2012), this 
therefore deepened the fall in the rate of employment -  calculated as the number of employed 
individuals (16+) as a percentage of the total working age population (16-64).  Therefore, Chart 2 
shows far sharper falls in the employment rate and also shows a later and more uneven recovery than 
the trend in total numbers in Chart 1.  For several quarters in 2011 and 2012, the increase in the 
numbers employed failed to significantly exceed the increase in the working age population, resulting 
in a flat or slightly falling trend in the rate of employment. 
From early 2013, the recovery in the numbers of employed began to significantly outpace population 
growth, leading to an increase in the employment rate in most quarters.  The current rate (for 
December 2014-February 2014) is the highest on record3, at 73.4%.  This compares to the lowest point 
in the time series of 70.1% (for September-November 2011). 
Chart 2: UK Employment Rates (% of population aged 16-64), December 2006-February 
2007 to December 2014-February 2015 (non-overlapping quarters) 
 
Source: ONS Crown Copyright, 2015. ‘Labour Market Statistics, April 2015’, from A01 Labour Market 
Statistics Summary Data Tables [accessed 22nd April, 2015]. 
 
 
3 Comparable records began in January-March 1971. 
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4. Trends in Wage Growth and the Structure of Employment 
Since sustained recovery in employment rates began in 2013, the Labour Party have drawn particular 
attention to the low rates of earnings growth.  Chart 3 shows that, until late 2014 (with a couple of 
exceptions due to bonus payments) percentage growth in both total pay (including bonuses) and 
regular pay (without bonuses) remained lower than the rate of general price inflation.  Therefore, in 
real terms (accounting for inflation) pay growth has been in strongly negative territory for much of 
the parliament – particularly in 2011, when the rate of inflation on the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) 
exceeded regular pay growth by more than 3 percentage points.  In the period July to September 2011, 
regular earnings grew by 1.7% on the previous year compared to a rate of inflation of 5.2% - a gap of 
3.5 percentage points.   
In September 2014, inflation equalled the rate of regular earnings growth (at 1.2% on the previous 
year).  From October 2014, inflation fell below the rate of regular earnings growth, and from December  
inflation fell below 1%.  According to the latest comparable period (the 12 months to February 2015) 
inflation is at a historic low of 0% on the CPI.  However, the chart clearly shows that there has been 
limited change in growth rates of regular pay, which have remained consistently between 1 and 2% 
for most of the Parliament.  The latest rate of growth in regular pay was 1.8%, which was only 0.4 
percentage points higher than growth for the same period one year ago and only 0.2 percentage 
points higher than at the start of the Parliament in May 2010. 
Chart 3: Growth in average earnings and the Consumer Price Index (% change on year), 
2010-2015 
 
Source: ONS Crown Copyright, 2015. ‘Labour Market Statistics, April 2015’, from A01 Labour Market 
Statistics Summary Data Tables [accessed 22nd April, 2015]. 
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4.1 The Increase in Part-time Working 
An analysis of the structure of employment provides some insight into the reasons for weak earnings  
growth and weak productivity growth (identified in a separate ONS release, ‘Labour Productivity, Q4 
2014’, 1st April 2015 – where overall UK labour productivity fell 0.2% on the previous quarter). 
A key message in the Labour Party narrative is that the recovery in employment, although positive for 
the UK overall, has been comparatively over-reliant on part-time, temporary, low-skill and thus lower 
pay and less productive jobs.  This has implications for benefit dependency amongst working 
households, in-work poverty, and the long-term sustainability of the recovery. 
Chart 4: Full-time and Part-time employment (thousands), December 2006-February 2007 
to December 2014-February 2015 (non-overlapping quarters) 
 
Source: ONS Crown Copyright, 2015. ‘Labour Market Statistics, April 2015’, from A01 Labour Market 
Statistics Summary Data Tables [accessed 22nd April, 2015]. 
Chart 4 shows that the total balance between full-time and part-time employment has shifted slightly 
compared to pre-recession.  In the three months to December 2007, 25.%% of the 29.18 million 
individuals in employment in the UK were working part-time.  At the start of the Parliament (the three 
months to May 2010), this had increased to 27% of 29.14 million.  This share increased to a high-point 
of 27.6% in the three months to August 2012, and then stabilised as full-time employment recovered 
more strongly – to the current share of 26.9%.  
 
Chart 5 shows why this shift has occurred, with part-time employment increasing whilst full-time 
employment contracted in 2008 to 2009, 2009 to 2010 and in 2011 to 2012.  In 2009 to 2010, full-time 
employment fell by 562,000 whilst part-time work increased by 157,000.  Although full-time 
employment has been increasing more strongly in the last 3 years, part-time employment has also 
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increased (although at a slightly slower rate), meaning that the structure of the UK labour market 
remains different compared to pre-recession. 
Chart 5: Change in numbers in Full-time and Part-time employment (3 months to February 
compared to same quarter a year earlier), 2007-2008 to 2014-2015  
 
Source: ONS Crown Copyright, 2015. ‘Labour Market Statistics, April 2015’, from A01 Labour Market 
Statistics Summary Data Tables [accessed 22nd April, 2015]. 
The Conservatives have defended the increase in part-time work as evidence of additional choice and 
flexibility in UK employment, indicating that more parents, students and those with elder care 
responsibilities are entering the labour force.   However, the Labour Force Survey also includes 
questions on an individual’s reasons for self-employment.   Prior to the recession (February 2006 to 
December 2007), only 8.9% of the 7.29 million part-time workers in the UK were working part-time 
because they were unable to find full-time work.  This peaked at 17.9% (of 7.88 million) in the three 
months to February 2012 and has since fallen to the current proportion of 16.4% who say they have 
been unable to find full-time work out of a total 8.2 million part-time workers..    
This is equivalent to 1.3 million individuals in the period December 2014 to February 2015, in-line with 
the statement in the Labour Party Manifesto quoted in Section 2: “1.3 million are working part-time 
because they cannot get a full-time job.” 
 
4.2 The Increase in Self-employment 
Charts 6 and 7 illustrate a similar shift in the balance between employee and self-employed jobs in the 
UK, with a small but significant increase in the proportion of individuals who are self-employed, driven 
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Party have placed less emphasis on this development, whilst the Chancellor, George Osborne, has 
attempted to present it as a positive increase in entrepreneurialism, that may lead to further job 
generation as the newly self-employed expand their businesses and recruit staff.   Analysis by the ONS 
suggested that the net increase in self-employment accounted for the largest share of total net 
employment growth between 2008 and 2014, accounting for 732,000 of the 1.1 million additional jobs 
in this period.  Self-employment reached its highest point since records began (a peak of 4.6 million) 
in March to May 2014, equivalent to 15% of total employment.  However, a large share of this self-
employment has been in low skill activities (with the most common roles including taxi driving) and 
amongst older males.  Consequently, average income from self-employment has fallen by 22% since 
2008-2009.4   
Chart 6: Employees and Self-Employment (% of total employment), December 2006-
February 2007 to December 2014-February 2015 (non-overlapping quarters) 
 
Source: ONS Crown Copyright, 2015. ‘Labour Market Statistics, April 2015’, from A01 Labour Market 
Statistics Summary Data Tables [accessed 22nd April, 2015]. 
The latest available data, shown in Chart 6, shows that the share of self-employment grew consistently 
from 2009 to 2014, from 13.1% to 15%, but decreased slightly in the latest time-period (to 14.7% in 
December 2014 to February 2015, equivalent to 4.5 million individuals).   
Chart 7 illustrates why this has happened.  Although both the numbers of employees and self-
employment fell between 2008 and 2009, self-employment then increased in every year until 2014 to 
2015 (where it has fallen very slightly, by 1,066 individuals).   The number of employees fell very 
significantly between 2009 and 2010, by 514,000.  As recovery strengthened from 2012 to 2013, the 
number of employees began increasing consistently – but self-employment made up almost 50% of 
the increase in total employment in 2013 to 2014. 
4 ONS Crown Copyright, August 2014. ‘Self-employed workers in the UK – 2014’, URL: 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_374941.pdf  
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Although total self-employment fell slightly in the most recent period, the more detailed data 
published in the LMS show that the number of self-employed working part time increased strongly, 
by 5.3% (compared to a contraction of -2.1% for all self-employment and an overall increase in total 
employment of 1.8%). 
Chart 7: Change in numbers in Employees and Self-Employment (3 months to February 
compared to same quarter a year earlier), 2007-2008 to 2014-2015 
 
Source: ONS Crown Copyright, 2015. ‘Labour Market Statistics, April 2015’, from A01 Labour Market 
Statistics Summary Data Tables [accessed 22nd April, 2015]. 
 
4.3 The Increase in Temporary Employment 
Temporary employment (particularly ‘zero-hours’ contracts with recruitment agencies) has become 
highly politicised, and is emphasised as a strongly negative development by Labour throughout their 
Manifesto.   The data, shown in Chart 8, is broadly supportive of this concern (although it explicitly 
does not disaggregate temporary contracts between fixed- and zero-hours).   The chart shows two key 
messages: 
• Temporary employment has increased significantly, from 1.52 million temporary employees 
pre-recession (December 2006 to February 2007); to 1.54 million at the start of the Parliament 
(March to May 2010); and to 1.69 million according to the latest estimate (December 2014 to 
February 2015).  This is an increase of 3.4% on the previous year, which significantly exceeds 
the increase in total employment (1.8%).  In their share of total employment, temporary 
workers increased from 6% pre-recession, to 6.2% at the start of the Parliament, to 6.4% in 
the latest data; and  
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• Of those on temporary contracts, the number of individuals who could not find a permanent 
job – previously level with those who were on temporary contracts because they did not want 
permanent work, at around 400,000 – has grown strongly from 2009.   There are now an 
estimated 591,000 individuals working on temporary contracts because they could not find 
permanent work, 35% of all temporary employees – significantly higher than the proportion 
at the start of the time series (26.1%) and significantly exceeding the number of temporary 
employees who explicitly did not want permanent work (379,000). 
 
Chart 8: Numbers in Temporary Employment and Reasons for Temporary Employment 
(thousands aged 16+), December 2006-February 2007 to December 2014-February 2015 
(non-overlapping quarters) 
 
 
Source: ONS Crown Copyright, 2015. ‘Labour Market Statistics, April 2015’, from A01 Labour Market 
Statistics Summary Data Tables [accessed 22nd April, 2015]. 
 
 
4.4 The Change in the Occupational Structure of Employment 
Finally, this sub-section looks at the structure of employment by occupation.  This provides a view of 
the changing skills mix of employment, as the Standard Occupational Classifications (SOCs) used in the 
Labour Force Survey categorise individuals’ jobs by skill level and extent of skills specialisation required.  
This data is not available in the monthly LMS.  Instead, Chart 9 presents data from the latest available 
quarterly release (which is based on 12 months of data, for the period January to December 2014, 
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
De
c-
Fe
b 
20
07
M
ar
-M
ay
 2
00
7
Ju
n-
Au
g 
20
07
Se
p-
N
ov
 2
00
7
De
c-
Fe
b 
20
08
M
ar
-M
ay
 2
00
8
Ju
n-
Au
g 
20
08
Se
p-
N
ov
 2
00
8
De
c-
Fe
b 
20
09
M
ar
-M
ay
 2
00
9
Ju
n-
Au
g 
20
09
Se
p-
N
ov
 2
00
9
De
c-
Fe
b 
20
10
M
ar
-M
ay
 2
01
0
Ju
n-
Au
g 
20
10
Se
p-
N
ov
 2
01
0
De
c-
Fe
b 
20
11
M
ar
-M
ay
 2
01
1
Ju
n-
Au
g 
20
11
Se
p-
N
ov
 2
01
1
De
c-
Fe
b 
20
12
M
ar
-M
ay
 2
01
2
Ju
n-
Au
g 
20
12
Se
p-
N
ov
 2
01
2
De
c-
Fe
b 
20
13
M
ar
-M
ay
 2
01
3
Ju
n-
Au
g 
20
13
Se
p-
N
ov
 2
01
3
De
c-
Fe
b 
20
14
M
ar
-M
ay
 2
01
4
Ju
n-
Au
g 
20
14
Se
p-
N
ov
 2
01
4
De
c-
Fe
b 
20
15
Th
ou
sa
nd
s
Temporary Employees Could not find permanent job Did not want permanent job
13 
 
compared to the same period in 2007).  This is significantly more robust for this kind of analysis, as it 
draws from a much larger sample size than the 3-months snap-shop published in the LMS. 
The chart shows that the highest skill occupations grew in both relative and absolute terms, whilst 
occupations in the middle of the skills hierarchy contracted: 
• The proportion employed as Professionals increased by most, from 17.8% of employment to 
19.8% between 2007 and 2014.  This was an increase of 807,800 individuals, equivalent to an 
increase of 15.5% in the absolute number of people working in this occupational group; 
 
• The biggest decreases were in Administrative & Secretarial Occupations (from 12.3% to 10.7%, 
a fall of 344,300 individuals or -9.5%) and Process, Plant & Machine Operatives (from 7.2% to 
6.3%, a fall of 192,200 individuals or -9.1%); 
 
• However, one occupation in the centre of the skills hierarchy, Caring, Leisure & Other Service 
Occupations, increased significantly, from 8.2% to 9.2% of total employment (405,000 more 
individuals or an increase of 17%).  This can be related to the continuing increase in demand 
for health care workers associated with an ageing population; 
 
• The Skilled Trades, intermediate-skill manual jobs closely related to Manufacturing and 
Construction, continued in long-term decline, falling from 11.5% to 10.8% of total 
employment (89,300 fewer individuals or a fall of -2.6% in total numbers); and 
 
• The share of employment in the lowest-skilled occupation in the SOC hierarchy, Elementary 
Occupations, remained stable at around 11%, whilst numbers employed in this group 
increased slightly (by 68,600 or 2.1%).   
Analysts refer to this trend as the ‘hollowing out of the middle’ of the occupational structure of 
employment, or the UK’s increasingly ‘hour glass’ skills profile.  Since the onset of recession and 
subsequent recovery, the biggest increase in employment has been at the highest skill end of the 
hierarchy, with all three of the most highly skilled groups increasing in both absolute numbers and in 
share of total employment.  The Elementary Occupations demonstrate that demand for jobs that 
utilise the very lowest level of skill (requiring no education, training or formal qualifications) has 
remained very stable (and has in fact grown in line with overall employment), whilst several 
intermediate skill occupations (especially Administrative & Secretarial) have shrunk significantly in 
both absolute numbers and in share of total employment.   
The changes in the middle of the skills hierarchy are highly gendered.  The fall in Administrative & 
Secretarial employment is likely to overwhelmingly affect women, who accounted for 76.6% of 
employment in this group in 2014.  However, women are also likely to be the main beneficiaries of 
increased employment in Caring, Leisure & Other Service Occupations, accounting for 82.6% of 
employment in that group.  Men are likely to make up the majority of job losses in the Skilled Trades, 
as 90.7% of employment in this occupational group was male in 2014. 
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Chart 9: Employment by Major Occupational Group (% of total employment by SOC2010), 
January-December 2007 and January-December 2014 
 
Source: ONS Crown Copyright, 2015. ‘Annual Population Survey’, January-December 2007 and 
January-December 2014. From NOMIS [accessed 27th April, 2015]. 
 
5. Conclusions and Notes for Further Research 
This analysis of the latest monthly LMS and quarterly LFS has suggested that: 
• There is merit in the Conservatives claim of the total increase in UK employment over the five 
years of the Parliament, with the caveats that the increase has been uneven (with falls in 
employment early in the Parliament) and failed to consistently keep up with the growth in 
total population until 2013 (resulting in a slower recovery in the rate of employment); 
however 
 
• There is also merit in the Labour Party’s emphasis on the quality of employment.  They are 
accurate in the increase in part-time work and the increase in the number working part-time 
because they were unable to find full-time work (rather than by choice).  Temporary work has 
also increased very significantly (driven largely by people working on temporary contracts 
because they had been unable to find permanent work, rather than by choice).  There has 
been little change in the nominal rate of earnings growth – so the improvement in real 
earnings is almost entirely down to historically low levels of general price inflation.  Labour 
could place more emphasis on the skills mix of employment, and the implication that the 
recovery has principally benefited highly skilled workers, whilst demand for intermediate-
level occupations has shrunk compared to pre-recession (with the exception of care-related 
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activities).   This has significant implications for the emphasis placed on Apprenticeships by 
both Parties – as this is a level of education and training most likely to lead to employment in 
an intermediate-level occupation. 
 
As this working paper has a fairly limited scope, and draws mainly on the data in the monthly LMS, it 
highlights a number of areas for potential future research, including: 
• Trends in unemployment and economic inactivity, including the reasons for economic 
inactivity and the relationship with key welfare reforms; 
 
• Analysis of the relationship between the change in employment by occupation and sector 
(industry) and between occupation and level of highest qualification, particularly in identifying 
potential increases in under/over employment; 
 
• Disaggregation of part-time and self-employment by occupation and sector; 
 
• More detailed analysis of trends in hours worked alongside the ONS estimates of Labour 
Productivity;  
 
• Analysis of key trends in employment and earnings by gender, age, ethnicity, country of birth 
and disability status.  This could include an investigation into possible under-employment of 
the very young and of older workers (skills mismatches at either end of the labour market), 
which could also draw on the ‘Skills and Employment Survey’; 
 
• Disaggregated analysis by geography.  The monthly LMS release enables analysis by English 
region and devolved administration, whilst the quarterly releases (available from NOMIS) 
enable analysis by Local Authority District, Unitary Authority and Local Enterprise Partnership 
(LEP) area; and 
 
• An exploration of subjective measures of well-being and job-satisfaction.  Task discretion and 
autonomy can be investigated through the ‘Skills and Employment Survey’ whilst the Annual 
Population Survey (which the Labour Force Survey is part of) includes annual information on 
happiness, wellbeing and life-satisfaction – which could be matched with individual 
employment characteristics, such as occupation, hours of work, and type of contract. 
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